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In an era of sustained budget cuts, England’s local authorities are increasingly forced to ‘apply’ 
for infrastructure funding via competitive bidding processes. However, we currently know little 
about how this method of funding impacts implementation. Accordingly, we consider the 
consequences of competitive funding by exploring the constraints associated with implementing 
infrastructure under the state-funded Cycling Demonstration Towns programme. This was 
achieved via a case study in Chester, a city that was unable to deliver the ambitions of their bid. 
This study was informed by figurational sociology in order to focus on relational processes. Fifteen 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with personnel involved in the planning and 
implementation of the project. The key findings were: (1) participants considered the bidding 
process to be akin to a ‘beauty contest’ where authorities were consciously making fantasy-laden 
promises in order to ‘impress’ the awards panel; (2) those involved in the bid did not consult key 
delivery parties, many of whom held car-centric predispositions, until funding was secured, and 
this led to complications in the delivery process; (3) during project implementation as the chains 
of interdependency of those involved widened, several unintended outcomes emerged which 
contributed to the two ‘flagship’ infrastructure proposals being halted; (4) this led to an 
intervention package that was heavily weighted towards promotional, or ‘soft’, 
interventions. Theoretical insight from this study suggests that competitive funding is likely to 
encourage authorities to present bids that are largely detached from the realities of implementing 
infrastructure, thus leading to difficulties once funding has been awarded. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1950s, cycling infrastructure has been positioned on the periphery of ‘main transport 
business’ in England (Aldred, 2012), where politicians have tended to prioritise motor traffic, 
regardless of the environmental, social, and economic costs (Pucher and Buehler, 2008a). This is 
likely to have contributed to cycling accounting for around just 2% of all trips (Department for 
Transport [DfT], 2018), compared to countries such as Denmark (18%) and the Netherlands (26%) 
where cycling infrastructure has been more extensively developed (Pucher and Buehler, 2008a). 
According to Pucher and Buehler (2008b: 11) “local governments in the Netherlands, Germany, 
and Denmark have been planning, constructing, and funding bicycling facilities for many decades, 
at least since the 1970s but much earlier in some cities”. In these instances, active travel [AT] 
policies and programmes are largely carried out at the local, or municipal, level; whilst the 
involvement of the state is mostly focused on standardising infrastructure design, safety training, 
and general promotion of AT (Pucher and Buehler, 2008b). This is said to be due to the assertion 
that municipalities are better placed “for making the specific plans that reflect the particular 
conditions and needs of the local context” (Pucher and Buehler, 2008b: 509). However, in England, 
AT is a more recent policy concern, with the first National Cycling Strategy (NCS) published in 
1996. A series of, largely advisory, AT strategy documents have followed the NCS over the past 
two decades (see Bloyce and White, 2018), however, as this has remained a national ‘issue’, AT 
proponents have had to continually compete for policy space alongside other mass-scale transport 
concerns, such as aviation and highways (Hull, 2008). Nonetheless, a small number of state-funded 
projects, aimed at improving the standard and visibility of cycling infrastructure, have been 
introduced (Aldred, 2015; Bloyce and White, 2018). In keeping with the government’s 
decentralisation agenda (Matthews, 2016), most of these AT projects are locally implemented and 
funded via a bidding process in which local authorities (LAs) compete for funding. Given the 
overall reduction in the total funding available at the local level in England, this model has become 
increasingly common, particularly for LA projects that are beyond the legislative requirements of 
core services (Loader, 2002).  
According to John and Ward (2005), the government’s aim for competitive funding has been to 
encourage greater value for money, as bidding parties are encouraged to consider their plans on a 
cost-benefit basis. However, critics of this approach suggest that it only helps national 
governments shift problems of "economic decline and social disadvantage to the local level, while 
retaining control over the broad direction of expenditure” (Taylor, Turok and Hastings, 2001: 46). 
Furthermore, some argue that bidding processes themselves can be unnecessarily costly and time-
consuming for public bodies (Loader, 2002). Michel and Taylor (2012: 485) highlight how the 
“volatility and unpredictability” of competitive funding can limit an LA’s ability to create long-
term visions for infrastructure programmes, such as those relating to cycling, as progress becomes 
dependent on the allocation of funding. At the same time, there is little evidence to suggest that 
competitive bidding leads to better outcomes (John, Ward, and Dowding, 2004), especially with 
regard to costs (Flyvbjerg, 2009). Conversely, economists have utilised models, such as auction 
theory, to predict that the perceived requirement to put across the best business case to funders 
might lead to underestimates of completion timescales and overall costs (Flyvbjerg, 2009; Milne, 
Roy and Angeles, 2012). To the best of our knowledge, however, there has yet to be an empirically 
grounded study that has explicitly focused on the consequences of competitive bidding processes 
for AT projects, both in England and beyond. 
This paper focusses on the implementation of Cycling England’s Cycling Demonstration Towns 
(CDTs), the most recent example of major cycling infrastructure funding that can be explored 
retrospectively in England. This funding was disseminated via two separate rounds of bidding 
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processes, whereby 18 different LAs were awarded funding. Reports on cycle count data from 
these areas suggested that there was an average increase in cycling of around 26% by the 
conclusion of the respective projects4 (Sloman, Cavill, Cope, Muller and Kennedy, 2009; Cope, 
Kennedy, Crawford, Cavill, Parkin, and Sloman, 2017a). However, there was much heterogeneity 
across the ‘towns’ (Goodman, Panter, Sharp and Ogilvie, 2013), with cycle count increases ranging 
from +6% to +62% (Cope, et al., 2017a). This might suggest that, whilst cycling in all of these areas 
was still “modest in relation to that observed in much of continental Europe” (Cope et al., 2017a: 
6), some LAs were more ‘successful’ in implementing their proposals than others. In order to learn 
more about the difficulties of implementation, we focus on the CDT project in Chester, a city in 
the North West of England that generated over £4 million of funding5. When analysing data from 
Chester (including cycle counts, manual counts, and national physical activity surveys), Cope et 
al. (2017b: 5) found “mixed evidence of growth in levels of cycling over time from a moderate 
initial baseline”. Furthermore, the Chester CDT project was unsuccessful in implementing some 
of their infrastructure proposals, with several plans being heavily amended, and their two largest 
infrastructure projects abandoned. This ultimately meant that just under £400,000 of funding was 
not claimed from Cycling England. This empirical case study therefore focuses on the constraints 
associated with the process of developing competitively funded infrastructure projects in a place 
where implementation was problematic. Studying this type of case has the potential to shed light 
on how local policy dynamics can give rise to unintended outcomes. Very few researchers have 
followed the policy process of transport infrastructure and Marsden and Reardon (2017) note an 
absence of local policy makers’ perspectives within studies. Furthermore, there has yet to be a 
thorough examination of the experiences of local bidding parties throughout the implementation 
of competitively funded infrastructure proposals, with the majority of research focusing on policy 
making rather than what “happens on the ground” (Pollitt, 2016: 22). Indeed, Whitford (2007: 62) 
suggests that “most studies have paid less attention to the design and execution of mechanisms 
by focusing instead on why and when services are contracted out”. Flyvbjerg, Glenting and 
Rønnest (2004: 47) therefore argue that more research is required on the role of bidders and 
“constructors” throughout the bidding and implementation stages.  
Finally, previous research has explored factors that may affect the uptake of AT programmes. This 
field of research presents the opportunity to draw comparisons between countries with high levels 
of cycling (see Pucher and Buehler, 2008a), and those which have yet to generate significant 
increases in their cycling percentages, such as England and Australia (Hull, 2008; Cole, Burke, 
Leslie, Donald and Owen, 2010; Pooley at al., 2013; Aldred, Waston, Lovelace and Woodcock, 
2015). The findings of these studies demonstrate that AT programmes in ‘successful’ countries 
have been most effective when they have been developed in a multifaceted manner, whereby safe 
and accessible cycling routes are supported by a range of information-sharing initiatives and 
measures which seek to restrict car use6. Indeed, it is often the case that infrastructure alone is not 
enough to encourage a greater number of people to take-up regular AT. For example, qualitative 
research in Lancaster – an English town that was also awarded CDT funding – suggests that, 
despite infrastructure improvements, residents had a range of complexities and contingencies to 
their travel habits, which meant that cycling was rarely considered as a suitable travel mode 
(Pooley et al., 2011). In countries where AT is a ‘fringe’ activity, policy makers have often stopped 
short of initiatives that are designed to reduce, or restrict, car use (Hull, 2008; Pooley et al., 2013). 
This has been attributed to politicians having little appetite to challenge their residents’ strong 
attachments to motor vehicles, with some assuming that the introduction of such policies may 
                                                        
4 These figures were relative to a baseline count from the beginning of each project. Automatic cycle count data 
only informs about the number of bicycles to pass a certain mark. The distance of journeys and number of cyclists 
in a city must be ascertained through other means. 
5 Chester has a population of almost 120,000 (Cope, Kennedy, Crawford, Cavill, Parkin, and Sloman, 2017a) and is 
the major city of Cheshire County, which holds a population of around 1 million. 
6 Restrictive measures are those that make driving expensive and inconvenient, often through “a host of taxes and 
restrictions on car ownership, use, and parking” (Pucher and Buehler, 2008a: 495). 
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affect their public approval (Aldred et al., 2015)7. It could therefore be argued that there are a 
number of internal, and external, constraints that might impact LAs as they attempt to implement 
AT plans. As such, the overarching aim of this paper was to explore how competitive bidding, and 
its associated complexities, would develop under this context of political balances. By drawing on 
concepts of figurational sociology, this study was designed to shed more light on the micro politics 
of CDT bidding and implementation by tracing the influence of interdependencies across the 
figurations of people associated with Cycle Chester. In doing so, it elucidates the relationship 
between bidding and implementation stages of government-funded projects more generally and 
focuses on explaining unintended outcomes associated with the realities of implementing such 
projects. Figurational sociology was valuable in this regard as it guided our attention towards the 
dynamic processes of implementation and, in particular, the influences of wider human networks. 
The next section provides a brief overview of the national CDT project, before then providing more 
details on the project in the city of Chester.  
1.1 Cycling Demonstration Towns 
In March 2005, DfT established Cycling England, an independent body with the aim of increasing 
the number of “short urban trips by bike” (Cycling England, 2010: 3). In October 2005, Cycling 
England, supported financially by the DfT and the Department of Health, announced that they 
were to provide £7 million matched-funding to individual towns (the CDTs). The aim of the CDT 
programme was to “explore the relationship between investment in cycling, as part of a whole-
town strategy, and the number of cyclists and frequency of cycling trips” (Chatterjee, Sherwin, 
Jain, Christensen and Marsh, 2012: 2). CDT funding was allocated via a bidding process for towns 
“with a population of approximately 100,000” (Sloman et al., 2009: 3). Of the 31 different LAs that 
applied, funding was made available to six towns8. This funding meant that the CDTs would have 
approximately £10 of matched-funding per head of the population for each year of the project. 
Such funding for cycling promotion was unprecedented in England, the typical English LA spend 
at the beginning of the programme being close to £1 per head (Sloman et al., 2009). Although the 
CDT funding was around 10 times that of the typical spend, it was still less than half the funding 
that was being spent in urban areas of the Netherlands, a nation long regarded as the ‘leaders’ in 
promoting AT (Pucher and Buehler, 2008a). With this new funding, the initiatives delivered in 
each CDT involved a mixture of ‘soft’ measures (e.g. cycle training and signage) and infrastructure 
measures (e.g. cycle lanes) that were tailored to each area to promote cycling as an alternative to 
other modes of transport (Goodman, et al., 2013).  
The CDT project was extended into a second round of funding in 2008. This was popular, in that 
“half the highway authorities in England submitted bids” (Cycling England, 2010: 3), which was 
approximately 60 authorities, of which 12 were chosen by the awarding committee to receive a 
share of over £43 million, proportionate to the population of each area (Cycling England, 2010). 
One of those chosen was Chester, which, like the other 11 areas, was awarded three years of 
matched-funding (Cycling England, 2010)9. By the conclusion of these CDT projects, the average 
annual spend on cycling had been £14 per head (Cope et al., 2017a).   
1.2 Cycle Chester 
The first time that the public were able to view confirmed proposals for the Cycle Chester project 
was via a ‘Masterplan’ document, named Cycle Chester (Cycle Chester, 2009). This set out an 
ambition to double the number of cycle journeys in Chester by 2011, via improvements in 
infrastructure, training, and ‘softer’ interventions such as parking and signage (Steer Davies 
                                                        
7 Of course, these are the exact predispositions that restrictive measures are designed to change. 
8 Chester Council did not apply for funding under this first phase of the CDT programme. 
9 At the time of bidding for funding, Chester was governed by both Chester City District Council and Cheshire 
County Council.  However, these bodies were replaced by Cheshire West and Chester (CWaC) towards the middle 
of the project’s timeline. This organisational change was due to the 2009 local government restructures, which led 
to a number of new unitary authorities across England (Local Government England, 2010). 
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Gleave, 2010). The proposed infrastructure projects included two ‘flagship’ projects which were 
separate bridges designed to help increase access for those wishing to cross the river that runs 
south of the city centre. One was to replace an already standing footbridge, and another would 
have been entirely new. In addition, there was a proposed 3km extension to an off-road cycling 
path, making use of a disused railway line, and a large permanent linking ramp which would 
connect this same off-road path with a retail park, university, and a canal route (the positioning of 
each of these projects can be viewed on the map provided in Appendix B). The delivery group was 
eventually able to generate £4.4 million. Of this total figure, £2.4 million was awarded by Cycling 
England as a result of becoming a CDT, and the Council then had to match this funding. This was 
supported by £1.25 million that had already been promised by the sustainable transport charity 
SUSTRANS. The rest of the matched-funding came directly from the Council’s budgets. 
By the end of the project, the total amount of funding claimed from the DfT was £2,055,634 
(Cycling England, 2010), with just under £400,000 of the funding allocation not spent. In 
comparison with other second round CDTs, this meant that Chester had the lowest annual spend 
per head (£11) (Cope et al., 2017a). In terms of outcomes, the Council reported a number of, largely, 
soft measures such as signage (680 new signs to indicate suggested cycling routes), cycle parking 
(including 48 secure lockers), and marketing/training events (Cope et al., 2017b). As for 
infrastructure changes, the Council designated additional areas of marked cycle lanes, including 
53km of off-road cycle lanes and paths (DfT, 2012). However, only two of the four proposed large-
scale infrastructure projects, the extension of the disused railway line and the associated linking 
ramp, were completed within the allocated three years. The two flagship projects never came to 
fruition. These outcomes are discussed in further detail below. Before we do, however, we provide 
a brief overview of the theoretical approach of this study. 
2. Theoretical framework 
This study is underpinned by the theoretical framework of figurational sociology. According to 
Velija and Malcolm (2019: 1) “significant bodies” of figurational work have developed in relation 
to policy, including policy implementation within the areas of sport (e.g. Bloyce and Lovett, 2012; 
Stuij and Stokvis, 2015) and health (e.g. Dopson and Waddington, 1996). These analyses have 
helped to develop a more reality congruent picture of “why policies implemented in 
organizational and community settings tend to have unplanned and unanticipated outcomes” 
(Thurston, 2019: 26). This suggests that figurational sociology has the potential to contribute to a 
more adequate understanding of implementation processes within transport groups. 
Figurational sociology was developed by Norbert Elias. He used the concept figuration to refer to 
“a structure of mutually oriented and dependent people” (Elias, 1994: 482). This could be any 
group, organisation, or policy network. The central dimension of a figuration is that power is not 
a property possessed solely by particular individuals, but rather, there is always a balance of 
power within all human relationships (Goudsblom, 1977). Elias suggested, therefore, that human 
relationships are characterised by a balance of power and it is these balances that lead to 
interdependent bonds. However, such balances are never constant; rather, “fluctuating power 
balance is a characteristic of the flow of every figuration” (Elias, 1978: 31). Interdependencies create 
uneven and shifting power balances that give rise to some individuals holding greater control over 
the interweaving actions of a given figuration at different times. Despite this, Elias argued that 
there will always be outcomes that no one party or individual has intended, as power is never 
absolute. The more complex the figuration, the more difficult it will be for one individual to 
achieve their intended aims (Elias, 1978). This is because individuals are forced to engage in power 
balances with a greater range of people, who all have their own motives, such that the intentions 
of any one individual become increasingly opaque. This leads to an increased likelihood of 
outcomes that were not foreseen or intended. One’s ability to steer a figuration is, therefore, not 
“simply a question of either ‘control’ or ‘no control’. It is a question of degrees of influence, in turn 
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related to power balances, and also a question pertaining to the ratio of intended relative to 
unintended consequences” (Dunning and Hughes, 2013: 47).  
Elias’s work on unplanned processes can be useful in understanding the development of 
competitively funded transport infrastructure. Flyvbjerg (2008: 4) explains that, despite claims of 
improved forecasting methods and more adequate data, that predicting costs and demand for 
transport infrastructure projects has remained “remarkably inaccurate for decades”. These errors 
can either be attributed to “optimism bias”, whereby predictions are drawn-up in a more positive 
light than experience would suggest, or “strategic misrepresentation”, where benefits are 
deliberately, and strategically, overestimated in order to increase the chance of being awarded 
funding (Flyvbjerg, 2008: 3). Figurational sociologists argue that these kind of actions are always 
likely to lead to a greater number of unintended outcomes, because, as Elias suggested, “the more 
fantasy-laden the basis for… interventions, the more likely… interventions are to have a higher 
degree of unintended relative to intended consequence” (Dunning and Hughes, 2013: 47). Of 
course, such plans are likely to be further compounded by the interweaving power balances that 
are generated within figurations as part of implementation processes. 
Of final relevance to the analysis is the way in which Elias explained how a person’s position with 
a given network can strongly influence their tastes, interests, and dispositions. At the centre of this 
is the term habitus, used to describe an individual’s second nature, which is ultimately a product 
of their socialisation within their figurations (Elias, 1978). Elias (1991) proposed that it is these 
fundamental dispositions that influence us in our interactions with others. We can assume, 
therefore, that policy makers and implementation groups constantly find themselves in power 
negotiations with many others within their figurations. Indeed, research tells us that LA actors are 
increasingly working with partners from beyond their professional organisation to deliver their 
transport goals (Stead and Meijers, 2009). These increasingly complex transport policy figurations 
have widening interdependency chains comprising those with varied predispositions towards AT. 
The extent to which those most closely involved in AT are able to manage these differing goals of 
the figurations in which they are a part is likely to influence the outcomes of the intended project. 
This is especially important in places such as England, where AT is not a core service for LAs, and 
there are currently no legal stipulations for LAs to improve AT provisions (Bloyce and White, 
2018).  
The above concepts have been used as sensitising concepts to inform the research process, from 
asking questions, to analysis and explanation, in order to reveal the relational processes associated 
with Cycle Chester. Sensitising concepts are useful as they give the user “a general sense of 
reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances… they suggest directions along which 
to look” (Blumer, 1954: 7). The ways in which these concepts were positioned in the research 
process are explored in the following section. 
3. Methods 
Adopting a case study approach to the study of competitive funding within the Chester CDT 
offered a way of studying social processes and thus relations and interdependencies across the 
cycling project figuration. In turn, this offered the opportunity of studying how actors’ actions are 
enabled and constrained by the networks of which they are a part (Dopson, 2003). A case study 
approach is thus theoretically consistent with a figurational perspective as it provides a way of 
studying social relations: that is to say, actors are viewed relationally rather than as “atomised 
individuals” (Mitchell, 1983: 192). 
In order to explore the processes at play in the implementation of Chester’s CDT programme, 
semi-structured interviews were adopted. These interviews were conducted between three and 
four years after the conclusion of Cycle Chester so participants could consider the project 
retrospectively. The interview topics were: cycling experience and involvement; experiences of 
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Cycle Chester; views on the planning and implementation of Cycle Chester; relationships in the 
Cycle Chester delivery processes. These topics were chosen as they related to the overarching 
research question, namely, how the relational processes of Cycle Chester implementation were 
experienced and understood by key stakeholders. The purposive sample consisted of 15 
individuals who were directly involved in delivering the project and other actively interested 
parties, such as charities and campaigners (see Table 1). Initial contact was made with officers who 
had recently been in charge of AT for the LA. From this process, various publications related to 
the project were accessed. The most important document in this regard was the Cycle Chester 
Masterplan (Cycle Chester, 2009). This document listed ‘stakeholders’ who met every two months 
as a ‘steering group’ to discuss how to promote and improve cycling in Chester (Cycle Chester, 
2009). As many of these stakeholders were working in public sector roles, it was possible to obtain 
the contact details of 15 out of the 18 members. In total, seven of the stakeholder group agreed to 
take part. 
The initial sample was supplemented by the two permanent project managers, who were 
acknowledged in project publications (Cycle Chester, 2009), and two members of national cycling 
organisations, whose support was consistently acknowledged in documents such as project 
newsletters. Furthermore, a snowball sampling technique was adopted (Bryman, 2015), whereby 
each of the initial group of contacts was asked whether they thought there were others who might 
be relevant to include as key informants. This process identified four further participants. This 
approach was informed by Elias’s emphasis on the need to follow how “individuals’ actions are 
embedded with other members in the figuration” (Baur & Ernst, 2011: 124). To that end, snowball 
sampling assisted in tracing the network of relations, as there were more opportunities to trace the 
span of participants’ figurations. 
Interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed verbatim and analysed thematically; the data were 
managed in MAXQDA11. The particular form of analysis adopted was reflexive thematic analysis 
(RTA). According to Braun and Clarke (2006: 79) RTA “minimally organises and describes your 
data in (rich) detail. However, frequently it goes further than this, and interprets various aspects 
of the research topic”. It is the latter that leads to the development of what Braun and Clarke (2019: 
58) label fully realised themes, which are described as “patterns of shared meaning underpinned 
by a central organising concept”. In this case, the central organising concept of each theme has 
been developed in relation to the figurational sociology concepts outlined above through an 
iterative process with the empirical data. In this way we did not seek to ‘confirm’ theory, but rather 
used the concepts to sensitise us to processes that could further understanding of our data in a 
way that would shed light on the research question. In other words, the themes that were 
developed provided a ‘story’ of the meanings behind the data. 
Our RTA began with a process of coding (an illustrative table can be found in Appendix A). The 
codes were developed to capture the different ideas to emerge across the data. Once a list of 
different codes was developed, consideration was given to how these could be combined into 
overarching themes that could reveal the dynamics of the Cycle Chester figurations and help 
explain the unintended processes and outcomes. These ‘candidate themes’ were reviewed and 
refined to check that sufficient relevant data to support them were evident and that they 
appropriately represented the data set as a whole (Braun and Clarke, 2006). As part of this process, 
interview data was analysed and interpreted alongside the official project report from Cycle 
Chester, meeting minutes, and SUSTRANS evaluations. In other words, the analysis adopted a 
two-way iterative process between empirical data and literature (Elias, 1956). Four key themes 






EJTIR 20(4), 2020, pp. 173-193  180 
White, Bloyce and Thurston 
The double-bind of competitive funding 
 










Council – Planning Officer Yes Public Male 
Independent Member Yes  Private Male 
Community Trust Representative Yes  Third Male 
University Representative Yes  Public Female 
Police Representative Yes  Public Male 
Cycling Campaigner A Yes  Third Male 
Cycling Campaigner B Yes Third Male 
Project Manager A No Public Male 
Project Manager B No Public Female 
Council –Vulnerable Road Users Officer No Public Male 
CDT Programme Manager No Public Female 
Council – Regeneration Officer No Public Male 
Cycling Campaigner C No Third Male 
Cycling Club – Chair    No Third Male 
Cycling Development Officer  No Third Male 
4. Findings 
4.1 Fantasy-laden bidding: Entering Cycling England’s ‘Beauty Contest’  
When the opportunity to bid for CDT funding was opened, there was a perception amongst local 
cycling lobbyists that the Council was not willing or interested in bidding: “Basically the Council 
didn’t really want to put a bid in, so we ended up trying to persuade the politicians” (Cycling 
Campaigner A). However, closer to the bid deadline SUSTRANS secured £1.25 million of National 
Lottery money for the area. This coincided with the appointment of a newly elected Council Chief 
Executive who encouraged Council officers to put a CDT bid together, using this grant as part of 
their proposed matched-funding: 
We weren’t going to do it because we didn’t have the support, we did mention it, but no-
one backed it up to support it. Then with a week before the [bid deadline] day the new 
Exec said ‘I want this, get a bid together’ (Project Manager A). 
When asked about the logistics of putting this bid together, participants who contributed to the 
document commented on how rushed the process was: 
Basically, we had six days to put the bid together. Someone in our team said ‘what ideas 
have you got?’. We said ‘oh, you could build an access here and there’ (Council – 
Vulnerable Road Users Officer [VRU]). 
It was sort of like ‘are we doing this? Let’s get something together’. It was panic (Project 
Manager A). 
The ‘panic’ referred to by Project Manager A led to hastily arranged discussions with local cycling 
lobbyists. However, without the ability to consult widely, both within the Council and beyond, 
the bid document was submitted with a lack of certainty about whether or not it was even possible 
to execute the proposals: “We won! But we had no idea whether these ideas were feasible” 
(Council – VRU). Indeed, it was not until after the CDT funding was secured that a consultant was 
hired to further develop the infrastructure plans: “Obviously the bid goes in with the best-case 
EJTIR 20(4), 2020, pp. 173-193  181 
White, Bloyce and Thurston 
The double-bind of competitive funding 
 
scenario, with a sort of level of detail… When you say we are actually doing it now, you then start 
to find more detail” (Council – Regeneration Officer). It would therefore seem that those putting 
the bid together were conscious that they needed to develop a bid that would impress the funding 
committee and that they would concern themselves with the realities of delivering the project only 
if they successfully won the bid.  
Those participants working for the Council at the time of the bid were aware that several of the 
proposed ideas in the plan, particularly the infrastructure improvements, were heavily fantasy-
laden. For example, the first project manager of Cycle Chester stated that: “The two new bridges 
would have been the first bridges [built in Chester] since 1900!” (Project Manager A). However, it 
was felt that the proposals needed to be ambitious whilst also being aligned with the interests of 
those awarding the funding. As one of the project managers said: “We would basically go through 
the brief and try to tick all the boxes and say how fantastic we were and the exciting things we 
could do with the money from the project” (Project Manager A). This approach drew some 
criticism from local cycling lobbyists, however, as it was seen as somewhat superficial. One 
lobbyist, who was involved in designing the Cycle Chester bid, said: “The DfT didn’t really know 
what they wanted… So again we had this beauty contest for the money and the DfT said ‘we like 
that one, we don’t like that one’” (Cycling Campaigner A). In describing this type of funding 
allocation process as a ‘beauty contest’, he implied that each bidding authority was obliged to 
present what were perceived to be more attractive bids than their competitors regardless of the 
veracity of what was being proposed. An additional consequence was that it encouraged 
“authorities to underestimate costs” (Cycling Development Officer). It was felt that the 
competitive process encouraged bidding parties to construct stand out bids whilst also appearing 
to be appropriately prudent, showing value for money. It was necessary, therefore, to ‘look’ the 
best, rather than necessarily having any detailed accounting, planning and preparation. Indeed, 
there was a perception that ‘sensible’, or more reality-congruent, bids would have less chance of 
winning the ‘beauty contest’.  
Chester Council employed someone whose role was simply to win funding bids across the council. 
It was this officer who was chosen to present the Cycle Chester bid to the DfT, despite having 
minimal prior experience of working with sustainable transport. That Chester then won the 
funding was said to be attributable to the experience and expertise of the officer who delivered the 
bid: “She knew what was required for the bidding process” (Project Manager A). Once the funding 
was confirmed, the project was then passed over to those with more knowledge of the practicalities 
of policy implementation. The overall Cycle Chester project was therefore constructed in silos, as 
the team who wrote the bid was almost entirely different from the eventual delivery team. As the 
proposed plans were then considered by transport staff, it became clear that there were going to 
be difficulties in delivering some of the larger infrastructure projects. In particular, feasibility 
studies for an entirely new bridge suggested that it would have “cost twice as much as the entire 
[Cycle Chester] budget” (Project Manager B). It was at this stage that plans for this bridge, one of 
the two flagship proposals, was removed from the project altogether. Thus, demonstrating how 
more reality-congruent plans were not developed until after the project funding was awarded. It 
is to an analysis of the enabling and constraining processes that developed as the Council’s 
delivery team began to share their plans with a growing number of people that we now turn. 
4.2 Accounting for individual and organisational habitus: Interdependencies in the Cycle Chester bid 
In light of the sudden decision to bid, the officers involved did not even have time to consult with 
the transport personnel who would be central to delivering the project: “The people who were 
going to deliver it weren’t involved in the consultations. We didn’t get that buy-in” (Council – 
VRU). Difficulties were then experienced at the implementation stage, as the team charged with 
physical delivery were not considered receptive to designing infrastructure for anything other 
than motor traffic: “The engineers just wanted to build for cars because that is what we were 
always told to do” (Council – VRU). These predispositions not only contributed to a bias towards 
motorised transport, but also a negative attitude towards AT interventions. For example, 
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participants suggested that the engineer team were automatically dismissive of particular 
elements of the cycling plans: “It just fell on deaf ears when we wanted to promote the more 
controversial stuff” (Project Manager A). The ‘controversial stuff’ was, in particular, the proposed 
infrastructure plans and road amendments that prioritised bicycles over cars. These plans were 
met with resistance because those whose job it was to design and modify infrastructure were 
already working from a position that favoured motor traffic. This was an issue which was further 
exacerbated by the lack of consultation from the bidding team, as the absence of engineer 
‘expertise’ in the bid document meant that these officers found it easier to dismiss proposed plans 
on the basis of feasibility.  
Council officers also suggested that delivery negotiations were not restricted to the LA’s road 
engineers. Indeed, many discussed how there was a need to repeat these processes with several 
departments across the Council: “Working on projects within the Council is quite an iterative 
process, you have to engage with people at different times to make sure they know about the 
project and work out ways to get them on board if there are difficulties” (Council – Regeneration 
Officer). Different negotiations needed to take place, in turn, with different Council departments. 
That large AT infrastructure had never been delivered in Chester before was said to have 
heightened the need for these negotiations, as many were considering AT proposals for the first 
time:  
They got this money and threw together people who were highways maintenance, 
infrastructure, project managers, and they were asked to do these extra duties. None of 
these had any cycling experience or interest. They were expected to deliver something they 
didn’t know a great deal about (Cycling Development Officer).  
However, this led to complications as, like the LA’s engineers, each individual now being included 
in the discussions had their own priorities and experiences, which very often conflicted with the 
AT work they were being encouraged to promote. This meant that the Cycle Chester project was 
never a priority for many of the staff only now being asked to get involved: “We had people saying 
‘I have loads of schemes to work on, that one is last on my list, am I bothered?’ If it’s not on their 
main list of schemes, then they are not going to do it for you” (Council – VRU). These individuals 
were heavily guided by pre-established professional concerns, which meant that the delivery 
timelines for Cycle Chester became harder to manage and predict, thus decreasing the ability of 
any one project manager to maintain effective oversight of the project. It was suggested that the 
Cycle Chester project managers would have been able to facilitate greater ‘buy-in’ from those 
responsible for implementation had the Council’s executives been more overtly supportive of the 
project: “You need to have your man at the top say we are not interested in cars, we need to get 
pedestrians and cyclists through the junction first. Until they are told to do that they will always 
do cars first” (Council – VRU). It seems once funding had been secured the Council’s leadership 
were less interested in really pushing the main elements of the project, which then gave officers 
greater opportunity to be guided by their own priorities. However, this is not to say that power 
and control over this project lay firmly in the hands of council leaders. Whilst their involvement 
and support may have had degrees of power and influence on priorities within council teams, this 
was not the only limiting factor in implementation. Indeed, participants described how those 
working on Cycle Chester experienced a number of constraining processes as some of the more 
advanced intentions were shared beyond the council. It is to this discussion that we will now turn. 
4.3 Cycle Chester’s wider interdependency chains 
The majority of work from the first 18 months of the project consisted of consulting with the city’s 
residents: “We spent the first year or so asking people what they wanted” (Council – Planning 
Officer). As with other consultations related to the bid, this had to be done retrospectively as no 
time was afforded for this prior to the bid deadline, subsequently delaying the project’s progress. 
This process was hindered by the merging of the two councils into a unitary authority, which gave 
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rise to staffing alterations such that the Cycle Chester project manager role was changed twice 
within three months. This concerned participants from outside of the council, many of whom had 
expected to see more tangible progress with infrastructure by this stage. This was something that 
was considered especially problematic given that the funding for the project was limited to three 
years. 
Given there was also no time devoted to consulting with the general public before the bid was 
submitted, it is unsurprising that some of the most notable delays came from the Council trying to 
respond to the concerns of residents upon discovering the proposed cycling infrastructure 
changes: 
I was a little naive and thought, you know, I always think of cyclists as very happy, who 
has got issues with cyclists? They are healthy and doing their bit for the environment, 
[laughs] no. It was quite a smack in the face to suddenly go ‘we don’t want cyclists, we 
don’t want them in the city centre, we don’t want them on the pavements, we don’t want 
them on the roads’ (Project Manager B). 
This quotation referred to the reactions of residents when plans for Cycle Chester were presented 
at public forums. Whilst this may not have reflected Chester residents as a whole, it was clear that 
many of the residents who vocalised their opinions on Cycle Chester were doing so in order to 
demonstrate distaste towards the development of AT infrastructure. As suggested by Project 
Manager B, that this group of residents felt so strongly about AT infrastructure came as a surprise 
to a number of Council officers. However, upon reflection, participants suggested that many of 
the objections were related to concerns about road congestion and fears that the introduction of 
AT provisions might worsen such issues: “Changing space for cars in a city that is already deemed 
as congested by residents, was there a lot of support to do that? Definitely not!” (Council – 
Regeneration Officer). Despite the fact that none of Cycle Chester’s major infrastructure proposals 
would have altered road space, the resistance from residents suggested that they were not willing 
to support improvements for ‘additional’ travel modes whilst they were already experiencing 
issues with their preferred travel mode, the car. For some, these habitual preferences were so 
strong that they wanted to actively lobby against AT work. 
The most prominent example of constraining processes to arise from wider interdependency 
chains was when various members of a sports club argued against one of the four major 
infrastructure plans of Cycle Chester, the replacement of an already established foot-bridge: “They 
gave all sorts of reasons why they didn’t want it outside the entrance to their club and they put 
the blockers on it” (Cycling Campaigner B). This club was able to exert considerable power over 
proceedings as the proposed plan meant that the Council would require a very small section of 
land owned by the club: “Even though it [the land required] was already part of a banking for a 
railway bridge. They gave all sorts of reasons why they didn’t want it” (Cycling Campaigner B). 
These objections were heard by members of the Council, and this translated into a lack of appetite 
to push through the plans for the bridge: “We ran into so much trouble that we couldn’t go back 
and change it, it was too late in the day, we just had to scrap the idea” (Council – VRU). 
Knowing that they did not have the support of residents and land owners, it was assumed by 
Council officers that any negotiations or legal processes would have pushed implementation 
beyond the DfT’s deadline for the entire project. The proposed plans for a replacement bridge were 
therefore ‘scrapped’. However, as the decision to halt these plans was not taken until the latter 
stages of the project’s timescale, it was not possible to explore alternative solutions. Many 
participants suggested that this was the primary reason for the overall underspend for the project, 
as the Cycle Chester team did not have the time to make use of their remaining capital funding, 
meaning that around £400,000 of available money was not claimed from the DfT. This leads us to 
a discussion on the eventual outcomes of Cycle Chester and how these outcomes were explained 
by the different groups within the sample. 
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4.4 Cycle Chester’s ‘unintended’ outcomes: The tendency towards ‘soft’ interventions 
When discussing the eventual outcomes of Cycle Chester, participants suggested that many of the 
interventions were heavily weighted towards promotional activities: “Slightly gimmicky bikes 
around roundabouts with flowers on them, new signage, new branding, new fingerposts” 
(Community Trust Representative). However, in the absence of tangible infrastructure, there were 
concerns about the longevity of these interventions: “Even a lot of the branding has been wasted, 
because if I think of the average person, what will all this mean to them now, 3 years on?” 
(Community Trust Representative). Furthermore, there was a view among cycling lobbyists that 
the failure to deliver two of the four major infrastructure projects meant that the Council had 
missed an opportunity to increase the profile of AT in Chester: 
I think most people’s view [from the steering group] was missed opportunities, those two 
bridges could have been really iconic crossings that would have created a high-profile 
route for people (Cycling Campaigner C). 
Of course, the detailed costings for one of these two bridges suggested that it would have been 
wildly over budget. It therefore never had the chance of being delivered. What this does 
demonstrate, however, is that participants’ expectations for the project were very much attached 
to significant infrastructural change. Without these ‘iconic’ additions, there were fears about the 
impact that Cycle Chester might have had. 
When it came to the infrastructure that did get delivered, local cycling lobbyists were often 
disappointed by what they perceived to be a lack of ambition. However, when elaborating further 
on some of the constraints that councils face when delivering projects, Council officers argued that 
even the most unimposing physical interventions can take a large amount of resource and time to 
implement:  
What should be a straightforward “let’s go and put a line down a road and make a cycle 
path” takes 12 months because you have to consult and then you have to get state 
agreement to do certain things (Project Manager B).  
When you are trying to implement a complicated project, things can slip because in the 
legal processes things come out of the woodwork that you hadn’t really thought of. The 
net result of that means that the whole timeframe is skewed (Project Manager A). 
The officers therefore suggested that any failures to meet the delivery standards agreed by the 
steering group were not due to a lack of cycling expertise, but instead, constraints such as legalities, 
public opinion and documentation, which often meant that proposals were ‘scaled back’: “We 
would get asked ‘We have a masterplan in place, why can’t you deliver it?’. Well because it is 
against the law. It was a masterplan which was a bit of a wish-list” (Project Manager B). Clearly 
some of the Council officers had, through experience, a more realistic understanding of 
implementation processes, and had, therefore, already assumed that parts of the masterplan 
would not come to fruition. This more ‘realistic’ understanding of events may have also been 
influenced by knowledge of the fantasy-laden approach to the bid document, which was not made 
apparent to interested lobbyists. It was also compounded by the very late decision to even bid for 
funding. 
The conflicting aspirations of Chester’s residents became one of the most significant constraints 
encountered by the Council’s delivery team: “Sometimes things just don’t get done because 
someone is not happy. So, you have the conundrum really, are you better off keeping 95% people 
happy and 5% not or just not do anything, that is just the conundrum of public life” (Council – 
Regeneration Officer). This ‘conundrum of public life’ was explored further, with the same officer 
suggesting that proposals can become diluted when authorities attempt to deliver outcomes that 
suit all parties: “You have to find a happy medium that is often vanilla flavoured, it’s alright, 
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nobody loves it, nobody hates it” (Council – Regeneration Officer). The ‘vanilla flavoured’ 
outcomes described here referred to the Council’s retreat towards ‘soft’ interventions when 
discovering they did not have public support for significant infrastructural changes. However, 
Chester’s Regeneration Officer suggested that the alterations, or down scaling, made in order to 
please certain residents actually meant that no one party was completely satisfied with many of 
the outcomes. It was therefore argued that LAs have to be prepared to disappoint people if they 
wish to facilitate real change: “There are competing priorities, to keep everybody happy all of the 
time is a very challenging task, so you either accept that there is going to be change and people 
might be upset by that, or you don’t do anything. That is politics for you” (Project Manager A). 
However, participants questioned the extent to which authorities in Chester were prepared to 
‘upset’ their residents and begin to prioritise AT infrastructure: “To increase cycling you really 
have to decrease other areas, so basically cars. Was there really that mandate? Possibly not” 
(Council – Regeneration Officer). This suggests that, without the mandate to tackle the more ‘car-
centric’ views of residents, the Cycle Chester delivery team were unable to sufficiently control the 
implementation of their plans, an issue compounded by the tendency towards a more fantasy-
laden approach from the off. 
5. Discussion 
AT did not become a visible policy concern in Chester until someone more supportive was 
occupying a central position in the figuration. This is perhaps indicative of how AT policy is still 
dependent on the cycling ‘champions’ who operate at a political level (Aldred, Waston, Lovelace, 
and Woodcock, 2019). Indeed, AT is not a core service for England’s LAs, allowing local politicians 
to decide their favoured approach. Furthermore, the continued use of competitive funding means 
that money is available to those who demonstrate an active interest in improving AT 
infrastructure, or at the very least, are prepared to bid for pots of money made available for it. It 
is, therefore, likely that AT growth will continue to be haphazard and disjointed across England’s 
authorities. Furthermore, whilst the new council leader in Chester was supportive of the bid for 
CDT funding, it was also assumed that it was still worth attempting to submit a bid with just six 
days remaining. However, it could be argued that the Chief Executive perhaps sensed the 
expediency of launching a programme when new to their role at the LA, despite not being aware 
of (1) what the bidding team would be able to develop; and (2) how any plans put together might 
affect local residents. According to Weiss (1993: 99) this is a theme that is often found across policy 
planning and implementation, as politicians emphasise “take-offs, not… landings”. This is said to 
be due to the fact that “it is often more important to a politically astute official to launch a program 
with great fanfare to show how much he [sic] is doing, than to worry about how effectively the 
program serves people’s needs” (Weiss, 1993: 99). 
Prioritising take-offs over landings was a theme that continued throughout the Cycle Chester 
project, as those with bidding experience, considered to be best placed to make a great fanfare to 
the funding committee, took charge of the project at the early stages of planning, whilst the 
delivery team, who were able to develop more reality congruent plans, were not consulted until 
after funding was secured. These decisions follow the same pattern as other bidding processes, 
such as the right to host the Olympic Games, where it has been suggested that “the winning of the 
competition is a distinct exercise from the actual budgeting for the event” (Greater London 
Authority, 2007: 8). We argue that a similar process was adopted for the Cycle Chester bid, where 
not only budgeting, but all of the stated targets and infrastructure proposals, were purposefully 
detached from the realities of implementation. However, the bidding team presented these ideas 
to the funding organisation as they felt that attractive plans were what was needed to successfully 
win the ‘beauty contest’. Indeed, Flyvbjerg (2009: 15) suggests that competitive funding means that 
it is not necessarily the best projects that get funded, “but the projects that look best on paper”. We 
would therefore argue that there is much for bidding parties to gain from being overly ambitious, 
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and few incentives to do otherwise, especially when “negotiations are authorised and expected 
after bids have been received” (Whitford, 2007: 68). However, this means that the ‘winning bids’ 
tend to be those which hold the least reality congruence. Issues are then encountered during 
implementation, especially as these projects produce fewer benefits than first stated for greater 
costs (Flyvbjerg, 2014). Figurational sociologists would suggest that this is to be expected under 
the constraints of a bidding process which incentivises ambition and overestimations, as Elias 
argued that fantasy-laden thinking is always likely to generate a greater ratio of unintended 
outcomes (Dunning and Hughes, 2013). Even after the bid was won, there was still a felt need to 
at least pursue some of the ambitious aims, most notably the bridge replacement. This meant that 
the Council allocated considerable resources in pursuit of infrastructure that they might have 
known to be problematic had they developed a more reality congruent picture of residents’ 
feelings. That the decision to stop was made so late then actually reduced the LA’s ability to deliver 
some of their ‘softer’ proposals, as there was little time to spend the remaining funding elsewhere. 
We argue, therefore, that organisations attempting to gain competitive funding are placed in 
something of a double-bind process (Elias, 1956), that is, on the one hand, there is a felt need to 
make the bid highly ambitious so as to stand out above other bids, but this wish-list, or ‘beauty 
contest’, approach actually undermines the ability to implement more realistic ideas once the bid 
is won.  
It is clear the delivery group’s ability to implement even their more realistic plans became 
increasingly constrained as the interdependencies associated with implementation became more 
complex. This process first emerged when ‘handing over’ the implementation of the project to 
multiple Council departments, many of which contained staff who did not feel prepared to 
support AT interventions. Similarly, Cole et al. (2010) found from their sample of transport officers 
in Australia that road engineers were largely indifferent towards AT interventions, as they did not 
consider walking and cycling to be important travel modes. We would suggest that such 
professional predispositions, or habituses, are not only influenced by previous training and typical 
ways of working, but also the way in which individuals in low cycling countries are socialised 
towards prioritising cars. This form of silo-working, and rejection of new plans, exemplifies how 
the figurational concept of human interdependency does not suggest that humans ‘work in 
harmony’, in a functionalist sense. Rather, it implies theoretically that interdependent bonds can 
influence project implementation in a number of ways, including what actors do not provide, as 
much as what they do. This became particularly important in the project, as the officers who 
favoured dominant traffic modes tended to have more relative power over the path of 
implementation and were rarely encouraged to prioritise AT provisions by their seniors. Similarly, 
Aldred et al. (2019), who, after surveying over 400 LA stakeholders, found that respondents felt 
there was little pressure on LAs to challenge dominant thinking around travel modes. In the case 
of Cycle Chester, this was, in part, due to the fact that AT was still a ‘fringe’ policy area within this 
figuration, where many were trying to negotiate such interventions for the first time. Some 
participants therefore suggested that a number of these issues would have been ameliorated had 
delivery staff been consulted earlier in the process. However, our findings suggest that it is highly 
unlikely that amendments based on the realities of implementation would have been sought, 
regardless of the timeframe available, as this might have undermined the bidding team’s ability 
to win the required ‘beauty contest’.  
Finally, we suggest that a more accurate term for the processes associated with turning a bid 
document into reality would be implementation, and not delivery. This is because the use of the 
word delivery assumes that there will be a definite endpoint and that this endpoint is always 
planned and expected. However, this does not take into account the human elements of these 
processes and the unintended outcomes that, according to Elias (1978), will always be a feature of 
human figurations. For example, that a small group of dissatisfied residents were able to develop 
enough relative power that the replacement bridge was halted altogether demonstrates how LAs 
are significantly influenced by public opinion. This is not uncommon, as previous studies from 
EJTIR 20(4), 2020, pp. 173-193  187 
White, Bloyce and Thurston 
The double-bind of competitive funding 
 
England have shown that local politicians have a tendency to favour the anecdotal evidence of 
residents over more pragmatic forms of decision-making (Gatersleben and Uzell, 2003; Kelly, 
Atkins, Littleford, Leng and Michie, 2016). In the case of Cycle Chester this meant that the project’s 
proposals often shifted towards ‘vanilla outcomes’ that did not intrude on the priorities of 
residents. It could, therefore, be suggested that there remains a need to raise the level of awareness 
of, and acceptance for, AT amongst communities before ‘champions’ can hope to gain general 
support for their proposals (Pojani, Bakija, Shkreli, Corcoran and Mateo-Babino, 2017). However, 
when considering the car-centric predispositions of most residents in England (Pucher & Buehler, 
2008a), some of whom will dispute the rights of cyclists on roads, it is likely that there are always 
going to be cases where people and organisations are willing to lobby against the development of 
AT infrastructure. Participants therefore suggested that authorities need to be more prepared to 
‘upset’ people – at least in the short term – in promoting AT. Elias’s work is valuable in this regard, 
as he suggested that policies only have a chance of being successful if they consider the workings, 
values and desires (or habitus) of their target group (Stuij and Stokvis, 2015). We would therefore 
argue that a policy which focuses on a higher degree of ‘hard’ interventions is one which better 
recognises the limited mandate for an increase in AT amongst residents. Indeed, it is to this type 
of approach that Pucher and Buehler (2008b) attribute the ‘success’ seen in the Netherlands and 
Denmark, whereby the construction of infrastructure has been reinforced by polices that make car-
use less attractive. However, as the British government continue to locate AT policy “outside the 
core” of state business (Aldred, 2012: 100), it is unlikely that such policies will be mandatory for 
England’s authorities in the near future10.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper sought to explore the outcomes, both intended and unintended, of a competitively 
funded AT project in England. Our key findings were that the bidding process constrained those 
applying for funding to, often intentionally, over-promise on their plans for the project, in order 
to impress the bidding committee. This impacted on the process of implementation, such that there 
were many setbacks and amendments as project officers sought to develop a more ‘realistic’ AT 
infrastructure package, whilst also negotiating the views of others within their figurations. 
Consequently, implementation often drifted towards less ambitious approaches. 
Our theoretical contribution can be generalised beyond the specific Chester CDT case study as it 
can be used to explain how competitive bidding processes can give rise to unintended 
consequences in other cycling projects as well as beyond this field. In other words, generalisation 
is through theoretical insight.  To that end, the above discussion has demonstrated how those 
closer to the centre of power dynamics within figurations are able to establish a degree of control 
on the development of projects, yet as the chains of interdependency continue to lengthen, a 
greater number of people are able to assert their priorities on project outcomes. For example, in 
this case, there was a notable impact from council leaders, by firstly making the late decision to 
bid, but then latterly, by not supporting the development of the project to the extent that some 
within the council had hoped. However, as we have explained, the path of this project was 
influenced by a number of people, within, and beyond, the Council, as the lack of reality-
congruence in planning, followed by disputes at the implementation stage, gave rise to a number 
of delays and alterations, with several proposals being halted altogether. 
                                                        
10 At the time of writing, we in are in the midst of the first global ‘peak’ of the Covid-19 pandemic. As in many 
other countries, this pandemic has meant that the British government has been forced to consider how regular 
practices can be adapted whilst adhering to physical-distancing measures. In England, this has led to the 
introduction of new legislation that supports LAs to implement temporary AT infrastructure, as a way of providing 
an alternative to public transport. Importantly, these guidelines were also supported by funding, totalling £225 
million in the first instance (DfT, 2020). It will therefore be vital to trace how these processes affect attitudes towards 
AT in England. 
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When analysing the planning and bidding for Cycle Chester, we have seen several features that 
directly relate to other competitive funding streams, such as those for highways projects, and 
major events such as the Olympic Games. Whilst the Cycle Chester bid was created in a much 
shorter timeframe than we can justifiably assume was the case for these other projects and events, 
our findings suggest that even if the bid had been influenced by more substantive and longer-term 
intentions, the nature of the bidding process meant that the bid was always likely to feature a 
significant amount of fantasy-laden aspects. However, what was perhaps different between this 
project and some of the more politically expedient, competitively funded processes, such as mega 
events, was that, after securing funding, the CDT project was not approached with a high level of 
‘seriousness’ or desire by many within the Council. Indeed, Flybjerg’s (2008; 2009) research 
demonstrates how there has been a long history of large infrastructure projects that overestimate 
their bids, yet are still implemented, albeit with an extended timeline and extended costs. 
However, the Cycle Chester project was heavily amended, and in many ways, downscaled, once 
key actors became aware that the project was met with resistance by some local individuals. This 
was explained by AT being a ‘fringe’ policy idea, that could feasibly be ‘left alone’. It would 
therefore seem that governments in low cycling countries have much work to do in convincing 
LAs of the benefits of shifting their core transport agenda towards more sustainable activities. 
Finally, we argue that the awarding of funding to Chester’s rushed and fantasy-laden bid reflects 
the extent to which the funding committee gave little priority to (i) the realism of infrastructure 
proposals; and (ii) the attitudes and priorities, or professional habitus, of those working within 
authorities. In other words, they tended to favour the ‘take-offs’ that were made possible by 
optimistic proposals. We therefore conclude this paper by making recommendations for future 
rounds of national infrastructure funding.   
6.1 Future recommendations 
There have been suggestions that the British government is starting to change their approach to 
appraising bids (Flyvbjerg, 2014). For example, the HM Treasury’s (2013) Optimism Bias 
Guidance, asks all government departments to negate the optimism of budget estimates by 
encouraging bids that are “based on data from past or similar projects, and adjusted for the unique 
characteristics of the project in hand” (HM Treasury 2013: 1). Despite this, Cycle City Ambition 
Grants, the latest round of competitive funding for AT infrastructure, invited authorities “to set 
out ambitious long term plans” (DfT, 2013a: 4), whilst demonstrating good value for money (DfT, 
2013b). As we have demonstrated, such criteria only encourage ambiguous optimism from 
authorities, especially when there are very few ‘long term’ AT infrastructure projects that can be 
used as benchmarks for estimates. This is further exacerbated by the absence of legislation 
requiring authorities to create their own AT strategies in England. Consequently, most 
infrastructure bids are reactive to the funding announcement. We would therefore recommend 
that such legislation is introduced, on the premise that it might encourage a continuous AT 
dialogue across local governments, something that has proved fundamental to the development 
of AT infrastructure in the Netherlands and Denmark. If successful, this might give rise to (i) more 
thorough bids that contain longer-term, evidenced-based, AT intentions; and (ii) a growth of 
support, or at least knowledge, from a greater number of people within the organisation that the 
bidding party is attached to. These developments may well give rise to fewer unintended 
outcomes, as more reality congruent plans are established and supported by key actors. With 
fewer objections, and a greater sense of shared goals within the relevant figurations, project leaders 
may be more likely, and better able, to have greater control of the path of implementation. 
However, this is not to say that evidence-based bidding removes the propensity for unintended 
outcomes entirely, as our analysis has suggested. What seems to be important is that planning 
teams are encouraged to monitor their plans and adjust accordingly, on the basis of the 
accumulating evidence available to them. This might help promote a processual approach to 
infrastructure design that, in turn, prevents disjuncture between bidding and implementation. 
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Note. The purpose of this figure is to demonstrate how the codes identified across our data were 
developed into full ‘story’ themes. It is important to stress that coding in our study was not as 
linear as this representation would suggest, as a number of codes could not be siphoned into just 
one particular theme. 
 
 
Codes      Categories  Themes          
Bid gigantism     
 
Optimism in the bidding process 
 
Fantasy-laden bidding 
Rushed bidding        
LA worker views of bidding      
Lack of planning     
 
Reality-congruent planning   
Rushed bid        
Communication (within the LA)     
Communication (outside of the LA)     
Cycling experience      Personal interest/involvement 
 
Individual and organisational habitus 
Working priorities/preferences   
 
 
Group ideologies (lobbyists)    Ideologies and habitus   
Group ideologies (engineers)       
Personal ideologies       
Influence of national decisions 
 
Figurations in flux 
 
Wide interdependency chains 
Change of council structures       
Public opinion      Local constraints   
Public objections     
    




Lengthening interdependency     




Consultancy delays        
Uncertain/unclear roles         
Influence of lobbyists    Degrees of power   
Influence of concerned individuals     
Implementation delay       
 
Amended plans 
 Unintended outcomes/soft interventions 
Project alterations         
Promotional     
 
Interventions and outcomes   
Training         
Infrastructure       
Signage/road markings       
History of AT in Chester    Status/presence of AT  
 
Previous infrastructure in Chester     
Legacy of facilities      Project legacy   
Legacy of projects         
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Note. This map shows the positioning of the four major infrastructure projects that were proposed 
as part of the Cycle Chester bid document. The green paths signify Chester’s current cycle network 
(the bold lines are off-road paths and canal towpaths, and the dashed lines are on-road paths or 
quiet routes). 
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